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Introduction 
Recently, openness has become a new approach in strategizing as ownership and control of 
internal assets are no longer vital to achieving competitive advantage (Chesbrough & 
Appleyard, 2007). Nowadays, knowledge is widespread and open systems are generally 
regarded as beneficial in terms of organizational design and work culture. However, openness 
also comes with politics and it is not a practice that will necessarily be welcomed by all. 
Openness changes the power dynamics within an organization; there are critics as well as 
friends, as we shall explore. Openness is a process that can change over time, becoming more 
or less open as events occur and contingencies or actors change. We are interested in how 
dominant organizational actors can seemingly manipulate ‘open systems' strategically. 
Openness is problematic per se for social systems. Systems endogenously construct their 
differentiation from other systems through closure achieved through specific cognitive rules. 
In this chapter, we use Clegg’s (1989) ‘circuits’ approach to a theory of power to grasp the 
politics of openness in terms of three circuits of power. Some of the recent problems posed in 
the wider world of social media will be analysed in terms of the three circuits to illustrate 
some potential problems.  
We start from the premise that organizational structures are constituted by rules that make 
variable resources available to different actors. These create relations of autonomy and 
dependence, which actors, drawing on resources, reproduce as relations of domination 
(Giddens 1981: 28-9). Structures provide rules and resources; systems are reproduced, as are 
regular practices through the codifications they deploy. Actors draw on these structures: the 
more strategic resources are held, the greater the autonomy and the less the dependence of the 
actors concerned. Actors in this context may be of any type: human or non-human, material 
or immaterial. When resources are deployed, they can be depleted as they are used or through 
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their use, they may increase in value. Creating power through reproducing particular 
ensembles of social order presupposes consensus and the regular predictability of other 
actors’ actions. Events, of course, can undermine these assumptions, as we shall discuss 
subsequently. 
In what follows we shall first define open strategy, providing some examples of what is 
usually involved. Second, we shall move to a discussion that positions the importance of both 
trust and power relations in developing open strategy, while considering the case for new 
forms of digital affordances, such as blockchain, to render these transactionally redundant.   
Third, we shall discuss the sphere that has been most privileged in discussions of open 
strategy – the field of open innovation, which we shall steer towards a politics lens. Fourth, 
doing so provides an entry to our next sub-section – the politics of openness, which we 
initially explore discursively before moving to a more analytical discussion, framed through 
the model of ‘circuits of power’ (Clegg 1989). In a penultimate move, we continue the 
discussion of circuits of power by addressing it to the conjunction of big data, open systems 
and open strategy, looking at the use of such data by firms such as Cambridge Analytica. 
Finally, we draw some overall conclusions about the politics of openness that, perhaps, run a 
little counter to some of the more enthusiastic discussions of open strategy.   
Defining open strategy 
Open strategy, as an extension of open innovation (Whittington, Cailluet, & Yakis‐Douglas, 
2011), involves harnessing collective creativity in the strategy process (Chesbrough & 
Appleyard, 2007). Whittington et al. (2011) define open strategy as an inclusive and 
transparent form of strategizing that allows participation beyond organizational boundaries 
(e.g., allowing consultants, customers, suppliers and even competitors to contribute) as well 
as internally. Inclusiveness involves previously excluded actors in the strategy making 
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process (Amrollahi & Ghapnchi, 2016; Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016; Dobusch, Seidl, & 
Werle, 2015; Kennedy, Whiteman, & van den Ende, 2016; Pittz & Adler, 2016), while 
transparency is a concern to be transparent when communicating with those actors 
(Amrollahi & Ghapnchi, 2016; Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016; Gegenhuber & Dobusch, 
2016; Pittz & Adler, 2016). Tavakoli, Schlagwein and Schoder  (2015), in a paper that arrives 
at a consolidated definition of open strategy, add ‘IT enabledness’ as a key aspect to facilitate 
inclusiveness and transparency through digital affordances.2  
Openness focuses on discovering, exploring and exploiting opportunities through multiple 
internal or external resources resulting in better or new products and services (Chesbrough, 
2003c; Dobusch et al., 2015). Open strategy creates value (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007) 
by lowering entry barriers for new stakeholders (Boudreau, 2010). Openness utilizes a 
collective intelligence, whereby involved stakeholders are connected so that collectively they 
act more intelligently than any individual, group or computer (Leimeister, 2010) to enable 
better decision-making (Stieger, Matzler, Chatterjee, & Ladstaetter-Fussenegger, 2012; 
Surowiecki, 2005), conceived almost as a digitally enhanced ‘invisible hand’. The result is 
claimed to be a strategy process that is ‘multivoice, divergent, egalitarian and inclusive’ 
(Aten & Thomas, 2016: 171). 
One example is crowdsourcing, which allows organizations looking for innovation ideas and 
solutions to engage a previously excluded crowd (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Boudreau & 
Lakhani, 2009; Howe, 2006, 2008), one that will not always be well informed either about 
technologies, strategies or investments. Organizations can crowd source innovation via idea 
                                                        
2 Digital technologies, including social media and web 2.0 now allow organizations to use ‘the intelligence of 
the crowd' analogously to the ‘invisible hand' to improve solutions, innovate or make better decisions. The 
analogies between open sourcing, the wisdom of the crowd and the invisible hand are family resemblances 
that have long characterised discussions of openness in a parallel ‘open’ stream to that of open systems theory 
– that of the ‘open society’ (Popper 2012; see Tkacz, 2015).  
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contests (Piller & Walcher, 2006), innovation challenges (Edwards, Logue, & Schweitzer, 
2015) and events such as the IBM Innovation Jam (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Bjelland & Wood, 
2008; Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2011; Lüttgens, Pollok, Antons, & Piller, 2014; 
Terwiesch & Xu, 2008). Brabham (2012) found the crowd to be predominantly made of self-
selected professionals who opt-in to crowdsourcing arrangements and exert large amounts of 
work and expert knowledge for little reward, serving the profit motives of those companies 
that initiate the open invitation.  
Open strategy: innovation  
Different motivations for openness exist, such as quite functional searches for faster and 
more efficient innovation. The desire for openness may herald more transparent and 
participatory forms of organizing (e.g. Tkacz, 2012) as Dobusch, Dobusch and Müller-Seitz 
(2017, p.2) suggest. In either case, creating a community of practice attuned to the specific 
constraints of whatever ideals of openness are enacted is vulnerable to criticism from those 
that do not share these ideals.  
Studies of open innovation have become very popular and led to a rapid evolution of the field 
(Huizingh, 2011; Van De Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Gassmann, 2010). Chesbrough (2003b: 
24) suggests that organizations increasingly follow external ideas via purposeful flows of 
knowledge, technology and resources beyond organizational boundaries. So-called ‘open 
innovation’ occurs in a distributed network that includes external partners (Bogers & West, 
2012; Chesbrough, 2006a). Through collaboration among internal and external actors, it is 
claimed, organizations are able to leverage complementary assets and capabilities, fast track 
the commercialisation of ideas and improve governance (Chesbrough, 2003a; Chesbrough & 
Bogers, 2014; West, Salter, Vanhaverbeke, & Chesbrough, 2014). Snow, Fjeldstad, Lettl, and 
Miles (2011) call this the Collaborative Community of Firms Model, where organizations 
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that want to succeed will have to share knowledge and engage in collaborative relationships 
with industry partners and stakeholders to drive innovation. 
The majority of studies have examined the firm-level application of open innovation (e.g., 
Chiaroni, Chiesa, & Frattini, 2011; Dahlander & Piezunka, 2013; Laursen & Salter, 2006a; 
van de Vrande, de Jong, Vanhaverbeke, & de Rochemont, 2009) via knowledge exchange or 
technology transfer between two organizations (West and Bogers, 2014). Those studies have 
shown how organizations can foster innovations together with suppliers, customers and 
partners via R&D alliances and technology partnerships (e.g., Clausen, 2013; Obal & 
Lancioni, 2013), through search and integration of knowledge and technology (e.g., 
Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Hughes & Wareham, 2010), and patent and IP portfolio 
management (e.g., Vanhaverbeke, Van de Vrande, & Chesbrough, 2008; West & Gallagher, 
2006). These open innovation mechanisms eventually advance innovation processes (e.g., 
Enkel, Gassmann, & Chesbrough, 2009), outcomes (e.g., Faems, De Visser, Andries, & Van 
Looy, 2010) and organizational performance (e.g., Laursen & Salter, 2006b).  
Thanks to the plummeting costs of communication and new technologies, collaboration at a 
distance across the boundedness of the system becomes more feasible (Chesbrough & 
Appleyard, 2007), relying on trust among actors being created either through a system of 
reputation, governed by a central party (Dellarocas, 2004) or governed by cryptography. With 
these possibilities for (closed) organizations that are part of closed systems to open up and 
achieve innovation, there is the possibility of value creation and strategic advantage being 
stimulated by joining or forming collaborative communities (Tremblay & Yagoubi, 2017) 
typically characterised as having open and transparent exchange relationships. A fine balance 
between openness and filtered selectivity for optimal results typifies ‘open’ power relations 
(Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 2006). A filtered ‘open’ system of cooperation can promote 
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innovation, elaborate different aspects of a problem and reform agendas through wider 
participation by different actors (Hardy et al., 2006), albeit under conditions that invariably 
involve agenda setting from the initiating organization.  
Open strategy: trust, power and blockchain 
Trust and power are two alternative bases for organizing relations with stakeholders. 
Relations of power over people functions as one amongst several media of communication 
through which dominant and subordinate groups of actors’ co-ordinate and control their 
social interactions. Another option may be to constitute a social relation with others based on 
trust (Fox 1974) as an alternative to one based on power relations. Trust is often seen as the 
basis for a relation of openness because organizations would not want to be open to those 
they did not trust, although a lack of trust does not prevent openness. While firms often trust 
internal knowledge more than external knowledge (Tapio Lindman, 2002), mutual 
commitment among involved actors (Bogers, 2011) or legal mechanisms (Dahlander & Gann, 
2010) can position organizations for more systemic open relations with other organizations.  
In an environment such as the Internet, however, the options of mutuality or legal dictate 
might not be available, resulting in a lack of trust and a negative impact on any open strategic 
initiative (Whitty & Joinson, 2008). Traditionally, organizations have been focused on 
ownership and control of (in)tangible assets to achieve innovation and competitive advantage 
by using the power leverage that these afford to create favourable relations with external 
stakeholders. Internal stakeholders are already implicated in hierarchical and other power 
relations through contracts of employment and divisions of labour. In the past, strategic 
innovation equalled control; to be successful, it required full control and a closed system, 
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protected with secrecy, patents and legal process (Chesbrough, 2006b).3 Innovative 
progenitors strove to steal a march on potential competitors; one thinks of high-security 
research laboratories, or skunkworks buried deep inside a bureaucracy. Of late, however, 
strategy and innovation have increasingly become associated with openness as a positive 
virtue, especially in terms of digital affordances. The most recent of these is blockchain, 
which changes the existing power and trust balances within organisations (Davidson, De 
Filippi, & Potts, 2016; Mattila, 2016) 
With contemporary digital technologies, such as blockchain, new environments are evolving 
that explicitly rely on an open setting. Trust is created cryptographically, adding a never 
before seen dimension to the game (Beck, Czepluch, Lollike, & Malone, 2016). Thus, as a 
research topic, blockchain brings a new dimension to openness, where traditional power 
dimensions may no longer influence an organization’s strategy because cryptography and 
smart contracts take over. Blockchain technology is a perfect example of a self-referential or 
autopoietic system of communication that reproduces itself by following an internal logic 
driven by a system-specific binary code. An autopoietic system is organized to respond to the 
world while preserving its integrity; it has a memory that organizes the parts even while those 
parts may be adding up to produce the functioning whole. With a single binary code steering 
the system, it can be considered closed as it can only make sense of external stimuli in 
relation to its own internal operations and parameters, lodged in memory and in smart 
contracts. On the other hand, the system is also open and not deterministic, given that the 
feedback from the environment, deciphered in the binary way of the code, influences its 
                                                        
3 However, today the world's biggest holiday accommodation company Airbnb doesn't own a single hotel, the 
biggest taxi company Uber doesn't own a single vehicle, and the biggest general store and bookstore 
Amazon.com doesn't own a single grocery/book (Goodwin, T. 2015. The Battle Is For The Customer 
Interface, Vol. 2017: Techcrunch.Goodwin, 2015). 
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reproduction.4 An autopoietic system is not deterministic but contingent over time, meaning 
that choices made lay the basis for later choices. Earlier choices are not determinate of later 
ones, but they help form contingencies.  
Research into blockchain is at the top of the current agenda for research into forms of open 
system organizational communication if only because it promises transparency in power 
relations and enables trustless transactions. What appears to be possible is the creation of a 
“fundamentally new paradigm for organizing activity with less friction and more efficiency, 
and at much greater scale than current paradigms” (Swan, 2015: 27). This decentralised 
technology enables an increasingly liquid society of networks in which the web interconnects 
much of social reality. However, we are not yet aware of how blockchain technology will 
actually play out as a political device. The ability to track all contributions to a system 
through the irreversible record of the blockchain enables all those actors that have access to a 
particular blockchain to know what transactions have occurred. While blockchain is certainly 
a mechanism for producing transparent transactions, it is not yet so clear what difference it 
will make to more structural, less transactional, elements of organization. In terms of open 
strategy, these will remain characterized not only by digital enablement, transparency and 
inclusiveness but also by a politics of openness. 
The politics of openness 
Open strategy is based on principles of inclusiveness and transparency (Amrollahi & 
Ghapnchi, 2016); it builds stakeholder relationships (Schmitt, 2010) and improves 
engagement of internal and external actors (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2013). Examples of open 
approaches to strategy have been documented in IBM (Bjelland & Wood, 2008) Red Hat 
                                                        
4 That this affordance is significant can be seen in the recent adoption by the Australian Stock Exchange of 
blockchain to replace the current Clearing House Electronic Sub Register System (CHESS) to settle share 
trades (Richardson, 2017)  
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(Gast and Zanini, 2012) and the Wikimedia Foundation (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2013). What 
characterizes open strategizing is a focus on sensemaking of the changing environment that 
combines industry dynamics and stakeholder empowerment to develop a strategy that, in its 
rhetoric, benefits all participating actors (Schmitt, 2010). It does so by enabling actors to see 
different aspects of the problem and opening agendas for wider participation by various 
previously excluded internal and external actors (Hardy et al., 2006). Increased openness can 
generate resistance and resentment (Luedicke et al, 2017); similar social technology 
platforms attract different levels of engagement (Neely and Leonardi, 2016); openness may 
sometimes need constraining in order to minimize identity-promotion and resentment of such 
promotion by particular individuals (Dobusch, Dobusch and Müller-Seitz 2017). The classic 
case of all three tendencies may well be the Kylie Jenner effect, registered on the 22nd of 
February 2018:  
The Snapchat parent's shares sank as much as 7.2 per cent Thursday, wiping out 
$US1.3 billion ($1.7 billion) in market value, on the heels of a tweet from Kylie 
Jenner, who said she doesn't open the app anymore.5 
Pursuing open strategy enables organizations to claim alignment between their objectives 
with those of their stakeholders (Newstead & Lanzerotti, 2010). Although any organization 
practising strategic openness will lose some control of its direction internally, the benefits are 
alleged to be that it creates a sense of ownership, belonging, loyalty, engagement and 
commitment amongst those involved (Dobusch et al., 2015; Gegenhuber & Dobusch, 2016; 
Luedicke, Husemann, Furnari, & Ladstaetter, 2016; Newstead & Lanzerotti, 2010); again, the 
assumption is that allies rather than critics are seeking engagement.  
                                                        
5 See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-22/snap-royalty-kylie-jenner-erased-a-billion-dollars-
in-one-tweet, accessed 22.02.2018. 
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Organizationally, openness can be relative: for instance, in terms of strategy, organizations 
are not fixed at any specific point on the continuum of open strategy and may move between 
different practices over time (Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016). Especially with software 
development, for example, where the driver is to develop software through the inputs of 
customers with the objective of reducing development costs and decreasing time to market, 
organizations will often use open sourcing (Spaeth, von Krogh, & He, 2014). Stakeholders, 
customers, critics, management and markets can change the parameters of practices 
(Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016). Organizations may move from open to closed for any 
number of reasons, including increased competition, which could lead one firm to acquire 
another in order to close it down in an attempt to reduce competition. Also, especially in 
mature markets, the benefits of being open decrease as competitors move from value creation 
to value capture (Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016). These drivers admit diverse sources of 
social closure into the open system and, as such, there are broad and nuanced reasons why 
organizations might shift on the continuum of closed vs. open. 
Whittington et al. (2011) suggest that open strategy may not be appropriate for every 
organization. Open strategy is not binary but exists on a continuum (Amrollahi & Ghapnchi, 
2016; Appleyard & Chesbrough, 2016; Dobusch & Kapeller, 2013) and where it is on the 
continuum differs for every type of organization (Whittington et al., 2011). The more 
interaction occurs within the open strategy-making process, the more the potential loss of 
control by the organization (Amrollahi & Ghapnchi, 2016; Dobusch & Kapeller, 2013; 
Luedicke et al., 2016): openness has a politics. As Heracleous et al. (2017) note, variable 
voice, appropriate degree of structuring of the process of openness, and the need to take 
account of diverse perspectives to arrive at a commonly shared direction for the future all 
entail a politics. 
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Dobusch, Dobusch and Müller-Seitz (2017) suggest that the idea of organizational openness 
does not signify some essential democratic ideal. As Kornberger, Meyer, Brandtner, and 
Höllerer (2017) show, opening up to external actors does not necessarily replace the need for 
secrecy within the organization, premised on areas of jurisdiction and existing hierarchies. 
Open innovation brings together different actors, with different objectives, philosophies, 
information processing capabilities (information may be too much, irrelevant or ambiguous 
for actors who have difficulty in extracting meaning from all that knowledge to improve 
interactions and conversations (Luedicke et al., 2016; Malhotra, Majchrzak, & Niemiec, 
2016) as well as different notions of status or power (Hardy et al., 2006). Differential 
knowledge is closely related to different capabilities for acting in power relations that might 
either positively, by enhancing power to, or negatively affect the outcome of open strategy by 
restricting access (Cronin & Weingart, 2007) or pre-defining relevant issues and non-issues 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970). Research by Dobusch and Müller-Seitz (2012), identifies 
filtering mechanisms that may be in place to enact such selectivity: for instance, O’Neil 
(2011: 8) suggested that some 1,500 people are determining what is ‘encyclopaedic’ on 
Wikipedia at a time that the project had 12 million user accounts.  
All forms of openness are also a form of closure as Dobusch and Dobusch (2017) note: where 
the boundaries are drawn is the issue. To dwell on boundary drawing and closure in open 
systems is to introduce agency and power in the construction of systems. The decision to 
open strategy formulation to previously excluded actors is especially likely for those 
organizations that attempt to lead through innovation while facing uncertain business 
conditions and so adopt an open strategy approach in order to try and learn from what they do 
not yet know (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007; Hardy et al., 2006). Organizations already 
participating in crowdsourcing or engaging with external others through a community of 
practice (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2013) are likely to deepen their openness. Especially this will 
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be the case, the literature suggests, when these organizations are facing real world, complex, 
interconnected and constantly changing environments, presenting ‘wicked problems’ 
(McMillan & Overall, 2016). Where many stakeholders with conflicting values are involved 
and where information is confusing (Churchman, 1967), multiple inter-related issues cannot 
simply be solved by solving each issue individually (Macfadyen, Dawson, Pardo, & Gasevic, 
2014; Schmitt, 2010). Under these circumstances, engaging stakeholders for sensemaking can 
help organizations create and construct new understandings from which they can take action 
accordingly (Dobusch et al., 2015; Schmitt, 2010). The engagement occurs, as remarked, on 
terms mandated by the initiating organization not those chosen by the stakeholders that 
engage. 
The ‘borders’ of all organization are emergent performative constructs composed of social 
interactions and interpretations (Czarniawska, 2014: 6) enacted by agencies shaping the 
system’s power relations. Mostly, they consist of the routines and practices that are regularly 
enacted and re-enacted in processes of organizing. Organization, rather than having an 
objective being (Nayak & Chia, 2011), is better viewed as a ‘momentary apprehension of an 
ongoing process of organizing’ (Clegg, Kornberger, & Rhodes, 2004: 158) or as stabilized 
expressions of behaviour patterns constituted as social actions (Schutz 1967), whose 
ontological existence is sustained by ‘rational myth' (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Therefore, 
openness is not just a characteristic of an organization but also an outcome of processes that 
involve not only the relationship between a reified organization and its ‘environment' but also 
the internal dynamics of the organization/system. Looking at the issue of ‘openness' or 
opening in this perspective unlocks an array of interpretive/critical opportunities. 
We shall explore these opportunities using a process model of power conceived of as flowing 
through distinct circuits. We will do so because, as we have established, being open does not 
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eliminate closure, it does not generate pure transparency, and it is not necessarily 
participative. In short, other than in the transactional world of blockchain, open strategy does 
not negate power relations. These power relations are not merely episodic, where the 
behaviour of some agency or agencies is restricted or directed by another agency, such as the 
collectively decided will of the 1,500 people determining what is ‘encyclopaedic’ on 
Wikipedia. Power is also positive: it can make things happen through being facilitative as 
well as shaping the dispositions of agencies.  An integrated approach to the analysis of power 
needs to be able to address these variable modes of structuration, which is what the model of 
circuits of power does. 
Circuits of power 
At the core of any analysis of politics are models of power: we have chosen to use the 
framework of circuits of power, developed by Clegg (1989), as the model for analysis. Early 
research largely conceived power as a mechanism creating effects over others, in which 
power was portrayed negatively (Lukes, 1974; Dahl, 1957) in terms of actors getting others 
to do what they might not otherwise have done. However, there is not just one essential 
model of power as Dahl (1957) suggests; instead, there are different concepts having ‘family 
resemblances’, as Haugaard (2010) puts it. In Clegg (1989), these family resemblances are 
accommodated through a threefold model of circuits of power (see Figure 1). The ‘circuits of 
power’ framework comprises three circuits of episodic, dispositional, and facultative power, 
specialized on agency, social integration, and system integration respectively (Clegg, 1989). 
The framework explores how different types of power circulate through networks promoting 
stability and/or change.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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The episodic circuit notion derives from Dahl’s (1957) perspective of a single underlying 
concept of power as causal, which, under appropriate standing conditions, can achieve certain 
outcomes. Normal organization power in relation to its members resides here. Members of 
organizations have agency that organizations seek to structure in pursuit of organizational 
objectives. The episodic circuit is characterized largely by power over others where others 
are obliged to do things at the behest of a dominant power, often one legitimated by the 
sanctions and privileges of authority. In this circuit, empowering others where they were not 
previously so empowered is a major mechanism for opening strategy. Increasingly, rather 
than rely on coercive measures, organizations are more likely to seek to empower their 
members so that they are able to use their agency creatively in pursuit of objectives. What is 
entailed is an enhanced organizational openness, where roles are more fluid, organizational 
relations and opportunities to make initiatives more liberal, and the overall organization more 
liquid than highly structured. An example would be the Holacracy developed at Zappos 
(McKinsey Quarterly, 2017), in which the organization chart is available online in real-time and 
is changed up to 50 times a day, with every one of 1,500 employees being able to view what every 
employee’s purposes and accountabilities are as projects shift. The episodic circuit is constituted 
by the actions carried out by these actors in their social relations in which they seek to control 
whatever resources are available to achieve intended outcomes. As Clegg (1989) argues, such 
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power requires the availability and stabilization of appropriate standing conditions as well as 
the overcoming of any inherent resistance either inherent in or to the freedoms that are 
charted. In Zappos’ Holacracy,  
The dispositional circuit focuses on the relations between actors in a social system that is 
open to other social systems. It embraces symbolic power associated with rules of meaning 
(the ways actors make sense of the world) and membership (what actors perceive to be 
appropriate categories of membership for framing social action). It is in this circuit that 
actors’ dispositions, comprising their sense of the institutional order, are fixed in Bourdieu’s 
terms as a habitus (Bourdieu, 1977: 95). The dispositional circuit concerns the nature of 
habitus in terms of the ways in which individuals perceive the social world around them and 
react to it. These are dispositions shared by people within organizations, who acquire habitus 
through mimesis and conscious techniques of socialization, induction and communication. In 
terms of power, the emphasis is on power to, through democratizing access to agenda shaping 
processes, meetings, issue formulation, shaping strategy as practice in the present in its 
formulation and in future in terms of its impact and those issues that it effects. An example of 
this is Phononics’ an early stage technology company that develops solid state heating and 
cooling by co-creating with customers in developing imagined futures in which highly 
complex, precision engineered equipment costing millions of dollars is co-designed by fully 
integrated teams of engineers, supply chain experts, sales and marketers working closely in 
partnership with customers defining new products, designs, prototypes, and manufacturing 
specifications (Chandell, 2016). 
This circuit is 'structured' because its dispositions are the product of past experiences and 
practising, which allows for the reproduction of practices, and it is 'structuring' because its 
dispositions allow for improvisation and invention in the context of new practices, the 
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emergence of new ‘rules’ of practice. It is through the introduction of new rules that power to 
is spread and distributed to places and people where open strategy designs it to be. Rules are 
both a source and a consequence of power. In the ‘circuits of power’ framework, rules 
depend on the context of interpreters, the actual situation in which the rule is interpreted, and 
the acceptance and enactment of those rules by actors (Clegg, 1989). Rules frame the 
relations between members of different systems through framing dispositional power that 
enables a set of capacities with potential application (Clegg 1989). For instance, in open 
engagements by organizations through co-creativity with customers and other stakeholders, 
the tendency is often to engage more fully with stakeholders whose dispositions are more 
aligned organizationally than those that are not. The problem in such a situation is that it is 
from the fiercest critics rather than the warmest friends that an organization is likely to learn 
innovations that further system integration.  
The facilitative circuit focuses on situations where material conditions of production or 
relations of knowledge between actors and actants change, empowering or disempowering 
relations with these actors. The circuit of facilitative power is characterized by power with, 
which entails making forms of collaboration with others and with other things possible. 
These collaborations may be with people, organizations, technologies and disciplines 
engaged in efforts to extend the range of powers of those concerned. Power in this circuit is 
exercised through being embedded in different forms of knowledge and disciplinary 
formation, often made material. These materialities, such as Wikipedia’s architecture, frame 
everyday routines that depend on actors' compliance with collective goals through the 
exercise of power translated into disciplinary practices, such as normalisation and 
routinization, establishing conventional borders of and for organizational practice. 
Episodic circuit of power relations 
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To engage participating actors, existing management needs to create episodic power relations 
with significant others. The notion of episodic power implies that there is a narrative in play, 
that there is a strategic and discernible direction to the power enacted with intent. 
Management needs to generate exchanges with specific others, identify with the relevant 
conversations that are exchanged, mutually establish coherence in meaning and contribute 
without harming the others’ objectives yet sustain tensions from which it can be represented 
that all actors can benefit (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). Too little engagement means 
that, from an organization's view of its effectiveness, specific actors, either internally or 
externally, prioritise their own objectives; too much engagement means actors, internally and 
externally, may end up subordinated to an organization's dominant objectives to the detriment 
of their autonomous being. In the latter scenario, a conception of organizational effectiveness 
that consists of total commitment on the part of participants overwhelms the effectiveness of 
individual autonomy; in doing so, it threatens the spark of creativity and innovation that is lit 
by deviance and lack of commitment – by what elsewhere has been termed ‘punk production' 
(Carlsen et al 2012). Thus, thinking more explicitly about the politics of openness, at the 
level of the first circuit of an open strategy, that of episodic power relations, the issue is one 
of engagement with and management of those invited in from outside the system.  
Dispositional circuit of power relations  
Social integration in more traditional and less open organizations is framed by explicit rules 
of meaning and membership. These are problematic in open ventures. There is no 
constitution defining the meaning of legitimate and illegitimate social actions, in keeping 
with open and anti-bureaucratic cultural tendencies. Identity is not determinate in digitally 
open communities: offline identities and competencies, as categories of membership, carry no 
weight online, nor are they differentially rewarded for there is no standard practice for 
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rewards and incentives (Newstead & Lanzerotti, 2010; Von Krogh, Haefliger, Spaeth, & 
Wallin, 2012). The basis for social integration resides online and nowhere else.  
There is a risk in openness: Habermas’ (1971) notion of an ideal speech situation is fulfilled 
to some extent – there may be few explicit barriers to entry but the geeky masculine culture 
offers many implicit barriers. Anyone can criticise or debate, not just those dominant 
authorities that may feel secure in dispensing with reasons’ tools (Flyvbjerg 1998). The lines 
between the reasoned and the risible may be somewhat elastic. To the extent that open 
systems’ communities revolve around meritocracy a too centralised approach is regarded as 
potentially harmful (Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). A fine balance between the different 
activities and guidance is needed to ensure the outcomes of collaboration (Hardy et al., 2006). 
Openly sourced actors are not regulated by contracts or financial incentives (Spaeth et al., 
2014) and to attract and keep actors engaged organization transparency in information 
sharing and feedback is important.  
Facilitative circuit of power relations 
The core claim to openness is that open source technology transforms techniques of 
production and discipline. The open system in contemporary practice is, above all, 
technologically enabled albeit that it may well be driven by cultural predilections, policy 
preferences and organizational requirements (Whittington et al, 2011). The ideal is that 
organization is open – anyone can contribute and in principle, anyone, irrespective of 
disciplinary credentials, is as expert as the next person. New obligatory passage points are 
readily formed, as innovative technologies become actants in the system. For instance, 
Dobusch and Müller-Seitz (2012) demonstrate that the wiki technology used by Wikimedia 
for large-scale open strategizing is used differently in different phases of gathering strategic 
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ideas and legitimising them. This is not use made by humans of a neutral technology so much 
as a process by which the affordances inherent in the technology engage the actors using it.   
In the politics of openness, relations are ideally between peers (as per those engaged in the 
open source software movement and open source content development) where anyone is 
potentially a peer; however, not everyone is equally qualified for engagement. Open strategy 
brings together different actors to create value: organization members, content creators and 
suppliers from outside as well as consumers and (digital or material) artefacts. Attracting, 
engaging and retaining these actors are key for successful organizations (Chesbrough & 
Appleyard, 2007; Spaeth et al., 2014). Organizations need to enable and encourage actors to 
participate, create and interact during strategy formulation (Kohler, 2015) to improve its 
quality (Dobusch & Kapeller, 2013) in positive ways. Organizations that seek to connect with 
actors for strategy making from outside their system can seek to shape the intrinsic 
motivation of participating actors through utilizing resource bases such as their legitimacy, 
premised on factors such as reputation related to expertise (is the organization capable of 
fulfilling claims?) and trustworthiness (can actors trust the organization?). Relative openness 
is exemplified by the extent to which an organization encourages mutual knowledge 
exchanges between different actors. Due to the information asymmetry that exists between 
management and previously excluded actors (Yakis-Douglas, Angwin, Ahn, and Meadows, 
2017), knowledge sharing within an open strategy can range from broadcasting only that 
strategic information deemed public from the centre, to starting a conversation and actively 
asking for feedback, to involving previously excluded actors in decision-making processes, 
which includes a higher degree of accountability (Gegenhuber & Dobusch, 2016).  
In principle, all practitioners in open strategy can potentially exercise power although the 
assumptions about appropriate interactions by designers of social media platforms might 
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frame who is able to enter online discussions and information sharing. Power not only 
requires but also creates knowledge. The recursivity of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980) 
might grant designers control over the strategic discussions that occur on the social platform. 
What is legitimate as a post or type of content may be more or less explicitly policed. 
Foucault argues that it is in power relations that identities become posited and resisted 
(Foucault, 1977). Hence, 'identity is always in process, always subject to reproduction or 
transformation through discursive practices that secure or refuse particular posited identities' 
(Clegg, 1998: 30). Since knowledge and power are irretrievably entangled (Foucault, 1977), 
the more knowledge that is shared within an open strategy the more the balance of power 
relations will be affected. Management may simultaneously diminish their capacity for power 
over by providing opportunities for new actors to be involved, enhancing their capabilities for 
power to make a contribution, and to the extent that the latter are successful and their 
innovations are incorporated in the organizational repertoire then by ‘giving power away’ the 
management may actually increase their power to as a capability. Therefore, 
power/knowledge reciprocity, as well as access to the matter being developed, is fundamental 
for the intrinsic motivation of the actors involved (Spaeth et al., 2014).  
Big data, open strategy and open systems  
Covert facilitative power relations through social integration 
While there are overt facilitative power relations of system integration, there are also covert 
ones. Carole Cadwalladr (2017a; 2017b), in detailed investigative journalism, shows how big 
data derived from open systems can be gamed for political advantage, since knowledge 
gained from big data analytics creates a competitive advantage (Chluski & Ziora, 2015; 
Gobble, 2013; Kiron & Shockley, 2011; McAfee, Brynjolfsson, Davenport, Patil, & Barton, 
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2012; Prescott, 2014; Sharma, Mithas, & Kankanhalli, 2014; Vinod, 2013). We shall explore 
this issue next. 
In terms of the politics of openness, big data analytic companies such as Cambridge 
Analytica create a ‘central node’ in ‘alternative news and information networks’ using open 
sourced data to do so. Their strategy consists of precise targeting of finely grained 
demographics constructed from the mass of available data. The data it uses is constituted by 
combining mass data harvesting of big data and micro-targeting of individualised messages, 
drawing on military strategies of psychological warfare to target a civilian population in order 
to influence their voting behaviour.  
Key to the whole enterprise of facilitative power working though open networks is Facebook. 
Facebook is a venue for in which ‘friends’ share their pages. Its data is harvested, in terms of 
likes, from which ‘personality traits, political partisanship, sexuality and much more’ 
(Cadwalladr 2017a) can be inferred with a very high probability of accuracy. The disciplinary 
power that enabled access to this data was personality testing. A company, known as Global 
Science research, advertised for Facebook users who would be paid to take a personality test, 
which over six million people did. An academic Aleksandr Kogan, using his company, 
Global Science Research (GSR), in collaboration with Cambridge Analytica, paid hundreds 
of thousands of users to take a personality test on the basis of an agreement that their data 
was available for academic use. This data was then combined with the purchase of ‘consumer 
datasets – on everything from magazine subscriptions to airline travel and uniquely 
[Cambridge Analytica] appended these with the psych data to voter files. It matched all this 
information to people’s addresses, their phone numbers and often their email addresses’ 
(Cadwalladr 2017a). Doing this they were able to do what they call bio-psycho-social-
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profiling, not only of those who had completed the personality profiles but also those they 
nominated as ‘friends’ on Facebook.  
In the United States, this data matching exercise was done in the 2016 Presidential election 
both to target Republican voters to encourage them to vote and to persuade Democrat voters 
not to; in Britain, it was used to press the case for Brexit, bombarding a small number of 
people identified as ‘persuadable’ with over a billion anti-EU ads transmitted in the last few 
days of the referendum campaign. In addition, pro-Brexit traffic automated by bots on 
Twitter that was ‘programmed to look like people, to act like people, and to change the 
conversation, to make topics trend’, comprised over one-third of all feeds immediately prior 
to the EU referendum.6 
The actor-network created thus recursively generated and reproduced itself through its 
interactions (Law, 1992). The strategy that was pursued through the circuit of facilitative 
power in each case enabled one organization, the Republican Party and pro-Brexiteer 
organizations, such as Vote Leave, to extend their powers to communicate with voters by 
precisely targeting demographics and tailoring messages to these demographics.  The 
openness was not in the strategy itself, which was extremely covert but in the open 
availability of the data that Facebook afforded, unbeknownst to those who had proffered the 
data, combined with the results of the personality test, created through the users of an app 
developed by GSR. The business strategy of Facebook, based on individuals creating their 
own open systems of communication, albeit closed to those not included amongst the circle 
of friends, meant that these open systems of communication provided rich data that could be 
                                                        
6 Behind Cambridge Analytica are the key figures of Steve Bannon, Trump’s once strategic advisor, and Robert 
Mercer, a reclusive billionaire, who also founded the Government Accountability Institute that trawls the ‘dark 
web’ to dig up adversarial data on political opponents that can be disseminated by bots to swamp search 
engines and social media, which as Morozov (2012a; 2012b; 2014; 2017) argues, shows the weakness of the 
openness of the Internet. 
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sold on to other organizations such as GSR who were able to trawl what Facebook had 
harvested. 
Simultaneous system integration and disintegration of circuits of power 
Analytically, what Cadwalladr documents is the simultaneous system integration and 
disintegration of the circuits of power created by use of social media. The strategies are 
simple; harvest data, identify the obligatory passage point that one wants to channel 
communication through, in terms of individuals and social media sites, automate the bots, 
bombard the messages, and strive to find the edge that advantages one’s side in politics (also 
see: http://www.smh.com.au/world/fake-news-why-the-west-is-blind-to-russias-propaganda-
today-20170123-gtxbuw.html). According to Morozov (2012, 2014), this has become 
possible due to, what he calls, the ‘fetish for digital openness’.7 The information provided by 
internet users on platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, offer organizations and (future) 
regimes a possibility to not only bombard people with personalised messages but also offers 
the ability to track down dissidents or dispense propaganda (Morozov, 2012).  
On March 16, 2018, as a result of the latest reports from the Guardian’s investigative 
journalists Carole Cadwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison (reported in The Guardian 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-
us-election, accessed March 17, 2018), Facebook announced that it was suspending access to 
Facebook’s platform and data for Cambridge Analytica. Within a week, Facebook shares 
were down 10%; US regulators, as well as those in Britain and Australia were proposing 
increased regulation of Facebook; Mark Zuckerberg was very slow in responding; Cambridge 
Analytica suspended its CEO, Alexander Nix, and the Cambridge academic, Alkeksandr 
                                                        
7 These strategies were used effectively in Russian information warfare, particularly in its informational support 




Kogan, whose company Global Science Research had provided the data to Cambridge 
Analytica in the first place, came under pressure from the University of Cambridge to 
confirm that no university data, resource or facilities were involved in the unfolding story.  
The circuit of social integration and dispositional demographics 
The politics of openness is premised digitally in this case in the circuit of system integration, 
on identifying and aggregating individuals who, perhaps unwittingly, reveal their dispositions 
online.  Cambridge Analytica used the Facebook friends’ data of those who took the GSR 
personality test to build a dispositional circuit of power of mega proportions: over 50 million 
individuals were analysed and categorised in terms of their dispositions. On this basis, bots 
were targeted to attack individual social media participants on a mass scale in pursuit of an 
end that was anything but transparently revealed. From the open systems of Facebook circles 
of friends new forms of social closure were achieved by algorithmically programming 
messages. By bulk buying domain names the initiating organization, Cambridge Analytica, 
used automation to create the appearance of a consensus favouring the chosen message 
despatched through the open digital system to the many members of the circles digitally 
identified.  
Shared and affiliated worldviews offer openings in terms of tracking dispositions. Through 
designing covert systems of social integration that amalgamate these dispositions and target 
them in terms of the emergent demographics enables data analytic organizations to exercise 
‘power to’ politically and culturally through system integration of the data. Simultaneously, 
however, the strategy creates overall system disintegration because it creates digital 
solidarities by disintegrating the electorate into those persuaded and those dissuaded through 
a form of psychological warfare. The most crucial categories of persuasion are premised on 
threats to identity of ‘others’ – people not like us – in the present and future. It is for this 
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reason that Facebook friends and likes are such a valuable field because they comprise a 
network premised on assumptions of identity and, as Lakoff (2014) notes, people vote in 
terms of their identity, their values and those they identify with. Messaging and websites that 
affirm that sense of identity, as they disaffirm the identity of those significant others that one 
opposes and that oppose one, then become the crucial strategy of closure in an open society. 
In such a context, whoever has the most resources of money, domain names, data, bots, and 
technology has stacked the best odds for effecting closure to their advantage. At present, 
these resources have been largely those controlled by right-wing populism, such as that of 
Trump and Brexit and, as Bauman (2017: 69) writes, ‘keeping anger perpetually smouldering 
and glowing offers the best recipe for the populists’ success: anger of the excluded and 
abandoned is a uniquely rich ore from which constant supplies of profuse political capital can 
be extracted’.  
Conclusion 
The most dramatic and, from the politics of openness perspective, most covert use of the 
open systems of social media, may be occurring in campaigns run by firms such as 
Cambridge Analytica. However, social media data is not only used in politics (Bennett, 
2012), it can also be used to identify an organization’s most loyal customers and followers 
and target them with personalised communication (Tucker, 2014) to either sell them 
personalised products or services or bring them closer to the business through co-creation 
(Lorenzo-Romero, Constantinides, & Brünink, 2014). As should be clear, co-creation is not 
only a form of system integration but also of social integration as it is a way of extending 
organizational commitment to those who are not necessarily paid to have it. Hence, the 
borders of the organization are not objectively defined other than by the flux and flows of 
meaning constituting the borders of systems.  
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Discussion of predetermined objectives can create an agenda of carefully constructed 
ignorance and knowledge, issues and non-issues.8 By carefully distributing ‘openings’ one 
creates and closes off obligatory passage points through the maze of possibilities. In 
Wikipedia, the tags that are attached to various entries would be a case in point9. Openness is 
paradoxical because organizing, by definition, entails selection and therefore forms of closure 
of alternative possibilities, times, and orderings.10 Notwithstanding existing orderings, change 
may be accomplished if the effects of endogenous change or the impact of events exogenous 
to the system enable the acceptance and accommodation of new sets of rules within the social 
system. 
New technologies such as big data or blockchain enable openness to the extent that they 
make it easier to find, connect and interact with previously excluded external actors. 
Nonetheless, as data-driven firms shift their focus from the marketing of products and 
services to the marketing of politics, a dramatic shift in the practices of openness occurs. 
Cambridge Analytica, along with a few others, is only one example of how data can be used 
for manipulative purposes. Companies such as Google, Facebook or Alibaba are 
organisations that have long recognised that data is a valuable asset (Fisher, 2009), collecting 
data rigorously since their beginning (Richards & King, 2014), resulting in them not only 
becoming powerful monopolies but also contributing to a centralisation of the world wide 
web and directly influencing politics.  
New circuits of power are being created. Internally to organizations, open strategy can be 
pursued through the reduction of power over, the increase in opportunities for power to, and 
                                                        
8 The Brexit decision in the UK is a case in point. Both Remainers and Leavers each accuse the other of having 
followed this strategy.  
9 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Tags, accessed 22.02.2018. 
10 Nevertheless, new forms of organizing are being experimented with, called liquid democracy, which enables 
citizens to vote, or delegate their vote, on any issue that requires a decision, bringing openness to new levels 
due to technologies such as big data and blockchain (Blum and Zuber, 2016). 
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the expansion of collaborative opportunities for power with. These are the ways in which 
organizations can pursue the positive benefits of an open strategy.  
There is a dark side, however. We have considered this through starting from consideration 
of the overall capacities for system integration and disintegration that are available to 
organizations that have access to capabilities for managing vast amounts of open data 
collected digitally. The examples we chose were Facebook, Cambridge Analytica and Global 
Science Research. Working on a collaborative basis with each other organizationally, they 
were able to focus on and restructure the demographics of individual dispositional power. 
Data analytics applied thus are a digitally disguised persuader, a targeted and deliberately 
fragmented version of the one-dimensional hidden persuasion that Marcuse (2013) found in 
Packard (1957). Personalised data gathered by organizations to offer personalised products 
and services seeks to reinforce or limit free will through the power of persuasion and 
reinforcements (Zuboff, 2015). As such, organizations have tremendous power over people 
whose data is available to organizations interested in them as either consumer of goods and 
services or of political options.  
While there remains hope that a better society that utilises advances in technology might yet 
bring Habermas' (1971) idealistic vision of an open society based on open communication 
closer to reality (Blum & Zuber, 2016), there are many reasons to be more pessimistic than 
optimistic. As in all matters of material reality, questions of the ownership and control of 
productive technologies cannot be ignored. Hence, there are ample opportunities for research 
to be pursued by scholars to understand how emerging practices will affect openness and 
whether or not emerging technologies will either increase openness (due to a decentralised 
approach) or decrease openness (because the artificial intelligence limits what it deems 
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important for decision-makers) as well as how the politics of technology-enabled openness 
will change over time, depending on the dimensions that are affected. 
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